While the national football team of Belgium
has reached the second round of the World Cup for the first time since 2002,
amidst a national frenzy never seen
before, the formation of a national Belgium government has again become a
highly challenging matter. Mr. Bart De Wever, the leader of the Flemish
nationalists and winner of the parliamentary elections of the 25th
of May, is about to hand over his resignation to king Philip today, as he has
failed in his task to lay the groundwork for the formation of a new government.
De Wevers
party, the NVA, gained six seats in the federal parliament in last elections,
whereas the second best winner, the communist PTB, won two. The latter seats
were lost by the Parti Socialiste (PS), the biggest party in French-speaking
Belgium, led by the outgoing prime minister Elio di Rupo. It now has 24 MP’s, whereas
De Wever has 33. Di Rupo’s party is the only one of the six in the outgoing
government that lost seats. The two liberals parties and the Flemish Christian
democrats gained one each.
Having been charged with ‘informing’ the King about
the prospects for a new government on the 27th of May, the
nationalist leader has been working on a centre-right coalition since then. He
wanted, in his own words before the election, make a government without the
socialists for the first time in 25 years. To do so he needed to lure the
French-speaking liberals and Christian democrats into talks. Although it is no legal
obligation nor a fix tradition to have a majority in each language group, both
parties together have only 28 of the 63 seats for French-speaking parties.
But the PS,
still the biggest party in both the Brussels and Wallonia regions, and with Mr.
di Rupo in front, announced on the 5th of June that it would
immediately form a ‘progressive’ coalition with the French-speaking Christian
democrats (CDH) in both regional governments. Since then, and especially in the
last week, it is obvious that the PS was
pressing the CDH to stay out of Mr. De Wevers would-be federal government. Today
the Christian democrats, regardless of the lobbying of their Flemish
counterparts, complied, when their president, Benoit Lutgen, announced live in
the evening newsshow of RTL that ‘there is no confidence’ between him and Mr.
De Wever. The latter now will have to hand in his resignation.
The key to understand these developments is that with
the announcement of the 5th of June, Mr. di Rupo gave priority to
the regional governments over the federal one. Although this move was probably
done because of the electoral defeat of the party, it is nevertheless logic.
Regional coalitions need two or three parties at most to agree, whereas on the
federal level federal it takes at least four (and usually more) parties to
obtain a stable government. And as the electoral landscape in the north of the
country differs strongly from that in the south, it is not so easy to obtain
the same coalition in the federal and all regional governments.
The paradoxes in this new development since early June
are manifold. In the institutional reforms of the previous government of Mr. di
Rupo, regional and national elections were put on the same day again, to have
less elections with national impact – now on average every two years – and to
make the same coalition on all levels possible. The political pipedream was
that with at least four years without an election until the local polls at the
end of 2018, and with similar coalitions everywhere, the country would at last
be able to make some urgent social and economic reforms.
Mr. De Wever,
in opposition before the elections, heavily denounced this as an attempt to cut
the wings of the regional governments, especially the Flemish one. He announced
that the first thing he would do after victory was to form a centre-right
coalition in Flanders region to influence the formation of the federal
government. For this he was denounced by the PS as a separatist. After the
elections both Mr. De Wever and Mr. di Rupo have made a complete turnaround.
Lured into federal responsibilities by the king and his Flemish Christian democrat
friends, Mr. De Wever forgot about his threat, whereas Mr. di Rupo, beleaguered
by the forces of defeat, put it into practice.
Mr. Paul Magnette, the acting president of the PS as
long as Mr. di Rupo is prime minister, last week proposed to give up the idea
that regional and federal elections should be held on the same day. Again this
is both a logic conclusion of the latest events, and totally the opposite of
what he and his party defended before the elections. Such a reform is quite
feasible in the next years, but would probably be the first step towards a new
round of institutional reforms that everybody before the elections – except for
the NVA – wanted to avoid.
Regardless of
the bitter emotions these betrayals have instigated, they point to the same
unmistakable fact: both the PS and the NVA use their leading position in each
of the two communities in Belgium as a stronghold from which they (might) start
their conquest of the federal government. And keep the other one out: in this
first phase of probably long negotiations, Mr. De Wever has put a veto in all
but name on a federal coalition with the PS. In an interview last Thursday Mr.
di Rupo did the same, by saying that no decent party of the French-speaking
part of Belgium can enter into a coalition with the separatists of the NVA.
The federal government has become a battlefield of
nationalist perceptions: if it will be centre-left, this will be perceived as a
defeat for Flanders; if it turns centre-right, it will be pictured as bad for
French-speaking Belgium. Such is the cleavage between the global electorates in
the north and the south of the country – Mr. De Wever talks of ‘conflicting
democracies inside one country’ – that most of the possible coalitions in the
federal government could be perceived as the defeat of one community.
Could a new coalition of the three traditional
parties, like in the outgoing government, be presented as the moderate centre,
neither left nor right? Probably not anymore. Mr. De Wever build his latest
electoral victory in Flanders on precisely the image that this government was too
leftist and going against the interests of Flanders. After his blatant failure
to lure French-speaking parties into a federal government, he will make this
point stronger than ever. As for the PS, it is, after its losses against the
extreme left, probably no longer prepared to make the same concessions to some
centre-right wishes of the Flemish electorate as Mr. di Rupo did in his first
term.
In the Netherlands in 2012 the strongest opponents –
the liberals and the socialists – also won the elections by polarising the
electorate. They decided almost on the evening of the elections to be pragmatic
and to build a coalition of both, as
there was no alternative. Due to the nationalistic polarisation inside Belgium,
which adds to the one between left and right, this is far less evident. But even
if NVA and PS would find a compromise, it would probably be built on very
limited ambitions.
Obviously the most logic solution for every neutral
observer is that, when you have such different electorates and parties in each
part of the country and they are no longer capable of making compromises with
each other after elections, due to the pressure of voters and media, then you
have to decentralise the country as far as is thinkable. Almost as far as
Switzerland, leaving to the centre only the competence on which everybody
agrees that they cannot be assigned to the lower government levels. The problem with this scenario is that
French-speaking Belgium refuses it.
Due to the long economic decline of Wallonia in the
second half of the 20th century, the south of Belgium still has a long way to go before it can on its own
produce the level of prosperity of the north. Up to now it can, via the federal
government, tap into the economic benefits of Flanders to pay, among other
things, a generous and large unemployment bill and the cost of a quite a
generous social security in general.
But for Flanders, that has run into economic troubles
itself since about a decade, it is less and less acceptable to be refused a
centre-right government that could lower the record tax rates, temper the still
fast rising costs of social security or reduce the surplus in average wage cost
in industry compared to the neighbouring countries. Saying no to the winner of the elections, to centre-right
(after 25 years of centre-left) and to further devolution at the same time, is
probably the shortest way to make separatism in Flanders the most reasonable
alternative. Implicitly, already a third of the electorate is in favour. That
is already a huge number to keep stability in a country structure.
In the end the
impossibility to bring on a new federal government might generate creative
solutions. In the nineteen eighties, the first regional governments were coalitions
that reflected the proportional division of power between the parties in the
regional parliaments. If this should be applied today to the federal government
(always composed of seven Flemish and seven French-speaking ministers) you
would have a coalition of the three traditional parties in both communities,
with the NVA. The latter would also deliver the prime minister. Such
stabilising and face-saving scenarios are not unthinkable, but they show as
much that the normal democratic process in the formation of a Belgian
government is deeply disturbed.
For the moment Belgium seems again on its way to a record-breaking
long negotiation for a new government, with a new institutional imbroglio is in
the cards. The idea that the next four years could at last be the big
opportunity to pursue much-need reforms in the country is now indeed only a
pipedream. On the contrary, the growing political complexities of this small
and often successful country, are now rapidly weakening it, with the ghost of
separatism closing in fast.